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8.1  Introduction 
A generation ago, economists who believed that the performance of mone- 
tary policy could be improved focused their criticisms and proposals on the 
specifics of how policy was conducted. Friedman (1960) and other moneta- 
rists, for example, argued that monetary policy mistakes would be greatly re- 
duced if  the Federal Reserve adopted such policies as money targeting and 
100%  reserve requirements. 
Since that time, there has been growing empirical and theoretical evidence 
that the specifics of policy are highly dependent on institutional arrangements. 
On the empirical side, characteristics of central banks such as their legal inde- 
pendence, the average tenure of their governors, and the objectives enshrined 
in their charters have been found to have strong associations with average in- 
flation rates (see, for example, Alesina 1988; Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini 
1991; Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti 1992). On  the theoretical side, it has 
been shown that policymakers’ ability to commit to their actions, the govern- 
ment’s ability to delegate control over policy, and contracts between the gov- 
ernment and policymakers can affect average money growth and many other 
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features of policy (see, for example, Kydland and Prescott 1977; Rogoff 1985; 
Walsh  1995b; Persson and Tabellini 1993). 
This evidence suggests that efforts to improve the performance of  policy 
should focus not on the specifics of  policy, but on institutions. This paper is 
therefore concerned with the design of institutions to produce desirable mone- 
tary policy. We  seek to identify the governmental structures that would over- 
come the obstacles to good monetary policy both today and in the future. 
The first step in this analysis is to identify the sources of monetary policy 
mistakes in the past: only by knowing what the obstacles to good policy have 
been can we think sensibly about what institutions could make policy better. 
In section 8.2, we argue that dynamic inconsistency has been overemphasized 
as a source of monetary policy failures. While there surely is an incentive for 
policymakers to inflate once expectations are set, this is not the crucial obstacle 
to desirable policy that many have assumed.  I  Instead, we suggest that limited 
knowledge about how the economy operates and the effects of policy has been 
a much more pervasive obstacle to good policy. We use a series of examples of 
monetary policy failures in the United States and abroad to show that limited 
knowledge on the part of  economists, monetary policymakers, and elected 
leaders and voters has been a frequent source of monetary policy mistakes. 
Sections 8.3 and 8.4 consider the design of monetary institutions in light of 
this analysis. Section 8.3 considers what institutional features are likely to ad- 
dress the individual problems we identify. As one might expect, the solutions 
to one problem may exacerbate another. For example, a binding rule concern- 
ing the ultimate objectives of  policy or the specifics of  how  policy is to be 
conducted is an obvious way  to deal with the problem of dynamic inconsis- 
tency. But such a legislated rule may be highly undesirable if expert knowledge 
about how the economy operates is limited. Similarly, long terms for monetary 
policymakers may lessen the problems caused by uninformed politicians and 
voters, but they make it hard to remove policymakers who turn out to be incom- 
petent. 
In section 8.4, we discuss one combination of institutions, selected from the 
menu of possibilities presented in section 8.3, that is likely to produce desir- 
able outcomes in the face of the whole array of problems. Some components 
of this institutional arrangement are completely standard. For example, it in- 
cludes a highly independent central bank as a way of both overcoming dynamic 
inconsistency and of allowing policy to be determined by  specialists who are 
likely to be particularly well informed about monetary policy issues.* Other 
features of  the arrangement, however, are less conventional. For example, it 
1. Previous studies of the design of monetary institutions by Rogoff (1983, Lohmann (1992). 
Walsh (1995b),  Persson and Tabellini (1993). and Debelle and Fischer (1994) all presume that the 
central problem that needs to be solved is inflationary bias arising from dynamic inconsistency. 
2. Walsh (1995b) and Debelle and Fischer (1994) mention the potential value of having mone- 
tary policy conducted by specialists, but do not develop this idea. 309  Institutions for Monetary Stability 
includes complete goal and instrument independence for the central bank so 
that advances in economic understanding can be incorporated rapidly into de- 
cision making. It also includes a two-tier system, where politicians choose a 
board of  trustees for the central bank and the board of  trustees chooses the 
actual policymakers. If the trustees have long terms of office, this system cre- 
ates a delay in the government’s control over the central bank that is likely to 
largely eliminate political pressure on policymakers. At the same time, this 
system makes it possible to have short terms of office for the actual policymak- 
ers, and thus allows incompetent policymakers to be removed quickly. 
Section 8.5 discusses the recent monetary reforms in industrialized coun- 
tries and the proposed design of the European Central Bank in light of our 
analysis of  the causes and remedies for monetary policy mistakes. Most of 
these reforms consist of shifts within the existing institutions to policies that 
make price stability the central goal of policy. We argue that these changes do 
not address the underlying problems that gave rise to excessive inflation and 
other policy failures in the past, and that they therefore do little to reduce the 
likelihood of policy failures in the future. But we find that the reforms in New 
Zealand and in proposals for the European Central Bank do alter monetary 
institutions in ways that are likely to lead to substantial improvements in policy. 
8.2  Sources of Monetary Policy Failures 
In order to determine which policy institutions are likely to produce desir- 
able outcomes, it is important to understand  the reasons that policy can go 
astray. This section therefore describes the most important potential sources of 
problems in monetary policy. We identify four major sources of problems. 
8.2.1  Dynamic Inconsistency 
The first, and best-known, potential source of  suboptimal monetary policy 
is the dynamic inconsistency of low-inflation policy. Dynamic inconsistency 
arises when expectations are forward-looking and the socially optimal level of 
output exceeds the equilibrium level. In this situation, the rate of money growth 
that is optimal after expectations are determined is greater than the rate that is 
optimal ex ante. As a result, rational policymakers who wish to maximize so- 
cial welfare have an incentive to be overly expansionary. 
Dynamic inconsistency may be an important source of  high inflation. For 
example, the fact that inflation is lower in countries with central banks that are 
more independent is consistent with the view that dynamic inconsistency leads 
to excessive inflation. Similarly, Romer (1993) and Lane (1994) show that, 
because the real exchange depreciation that is caused by unanticipated mone- 
tary expansion is more harmful in more open economies, theories based on 
dynamic inconsistency  predict that  inflation should be lower in more open 
economies. Both studies find that this prediction is confirmed by the data. 310  Christina D.  Romer and David H. Romer 
8.2.2  The Limits of Available Knowledge 
Dynamic inconsistency, however, may not be the central source of imperfect 
monetary policy that many assume. A second potential source of problems is 
that expert knowledge at any time of  the workings of the economy and the 
effects of policy is imperfect. The best that policymakers can do is to act on the 
basis of the evidence that is available when they make a decision. Subsequent 
improvements in knowledge may reveal, however, that different policies would 
have been preferable under the circumstances. 
There are many important examples of  problems in monetary policy that 
appear to have been caused at least partly by the limitations of the best avail- 
able knowledge. Freedman (1993) and De Long (chap. 6 in this volume), for 
example, argue that such incomplete knowledge was an important source of 
the high inflation rates of  the  1970s. The evidence available at the time sug- 
gested that there  was (or at least that there  might be) a permanent  output- 
inflation trade-off. In addition, the costs of moderate inflation appeared small. 
As a result, when policymakers were confronted with negative supply shocks, 
increases in the natural rate of  unemployment,  and the productivity  growth 
slowdown, they rationally believed that the benefits of  accommodating these 
shocks exceeded the costs. It seems unlikely that they would have made the 
same choices if  they had known then, as we know today, that there is not a 
permanent trade-off and that the costs of moderate inflation are in fact substan- 
tial. If this analysis is correct, it implies that one important reason for the overly 
expansionary policies of the 1970s was not dynamic inconsistency, but limited 
expert knowledge. 
Friedman and Schwartz’s (1963) description of U.S. monetary policy after 
World War I provides a very different example of the effects of imperfect un- 
derstanding. According to Friedman and Schwartz, little was known at that 
time about the lags in the effects of  monetary policy. As a result, when the 
Federal Reserve’s initial shifts toward tighter policy  in November  1919 did 
not have an immediate impact on the economy, policymakers responded with 
additional rounds  of  tightening  in  January  and  June  1920 (Friedman  and 
Schwartz 1963,229-39). The result was a major downturn in the economy that 
was largely unintended. 
The issues of optimal inflation and the benefits of stabilization provide more 
timely examples of the potential importance of limited knowledge. There has 
not been any comprehensive quantitative analysis of the potential costs and 
benefits of  alternative rates of  inflation. For example, it is only very recently 
that the first thorough attempt has been made to quantify the impact of inflation 
on welfare through its impact on saving and the composition of  the capital 
stock (Feldstein, chap. 3 in this volume); there are only a handful of studies of 
the issue of whether moderate inflation improves microeconomic efficiency by 
permitting downward adjustments in real wages without nominal wage cuts 
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empirical work on the link between inflation and long-run growth has barely 
advanced beyond the examination of simple correlations (Fischer 1991, 1993; 
Rudebusch and Wilcox 1994; Barro 1995). 
As a result, policymakers have no choice but to operate on the basis of intu- 
ition and fragments of evidence. Estimates of the optimal inflation rate range 
from moderate deflation, to zero, to moderate inflation, and policymakers in 
different countries appear to have different estimates. It is likely that once we 
have a fuller understanding of the costs and benefits of  inflation, we will be 
able to determine that some or all of these estimates were inaccurate, and we 
may find that in many cases there would have been large gains from aiming for 
different inflation rates. 
Similarly, defensible views about the benefits of using policy to stabilize the 
economy range from the position that the benefits are trivial to the view that 
they are enormous. If stabilization policy only reduces the variance of output 
around its mean, its likely benefits are small (Lucas 1987;  Atkeson and Phelan 
1994). But if the aggregate supply curve is significantly nonlinear, then stabili- 
zation policy can fill in the troughs in output with only small offsetting reduc- 
tions in the peaks, and can thus raise average output considerably (De Long 
and Summers 1988). Likewise, if  stability has an important effect on invest- 
ment,  then  stabilization policy  can have  a  substantial impact on  long-run 
growth (Meltzer 1988). 
Since we  have  little clear evidence on nonlinearities in aggregate supply 
or the importance of macroeconomic stability to investment, we do not know 
whether the benefits of stabilization are large or small. Thus again policymak- 
ers must make their judgments on the basis of highly imperfect evidence, and 
again there is a substantial chance that advances in knowledge will eventually 
cause them to change those judgments. 
8.2.3  Policymakers’ Limited Knowledge 
A third potential source of imperfect policy is incomplete understanding on 
the part of policymakers. Even if good information about the workings of the 
economy and the effects of policy is available, the individuals who determine 
policy may not have that information. There is no reason to expect knowledge 
of matters that are relevant to monetary policy to be instantly disseminated to 
everyone in the economy: since there are costs to acquiring even knowledge 
that is in the public domain, individuals’ understanding of  monetary policy 
issues is likely to be heterogeneous. For citizens whose only influence over 
monetary policy is through voting, for example, the benefits of acquiring accu- 
rate information about policy are negligible. Thus it would be surprising if they 
had a state-of-the-art understanding of the relevant issues, and it would not be 
surprising if they were unaware of important pieces of knowledge. At the other 
extreme, individuals who specialize in conducting policy are likely to have 
strong incentives to acquire relevant information. Even among these individu- 
als, however, understanding is likely to vary: such factors as their experience, 312  Christina D.  Romer and David H. Romer 
their instrinsic abilities, and the rewards that they face for conducting policy 
successfully are likely to influence their knowledge. Finally, since elected lead- 
ers are likely to have less control over monetary policy than those directly in 
charge of policy, and since they have less time to devote to monetary policy, 
their understanding of the relevant issues is likely to fall between that of voters 
and that of monetary policymakers. 
U.S. monetary policy  in the Great Depression provides  the most  famous 
example of a policy failure that may have been due to policymakers’ lack of 
awareness of the best available evidence about the workings of the economy 
and the effects of policy. In Friedman and Schwartz’s view, the failure of policy 
to respond to the banking panics and the depression was largely the result of 
the death of Benjamin Strong and the shift of power from the Federal Reserve 
Bank of  New York to the Board of  Governors in Washington. According to 
Friedman and Schwartz (1963, chap. 7), the governors knew relatively  little 
about the importance of monetary policy in stemming the panics and in com- 
bating the depression-not  because such knowledge was unavailable, but be- 
cause they had little experience or expertise in such matters. It was this lack of 
knowledge on the part of policymakers that led the Federal Reserve to stand 
idly by as the U.S. economy collapsed in the early 1930s. 
The modem  experiences  of  less-developed  countries  provide  many  ex- 
amples of policy failures that appear to have been caused by policymakers’ 
incomplete  understanding  of  existing  knowledge.  Even  among  those  who 
make monetary policy, knowledge of such basic matters as the importance of 
money growth to inflation is not universal. For example, Simonsen (1988) ar- 
gues that the underlying source of the failure of Brazil’s Cruzado plan in 1986 
was that policymakers believed  that Brazilian inflation was entirely inertial, 
and that it could therefore be eliminated by incomes policies alone. As he puts 
it: “The big mistake of the government was to confound necessary with suffi- 
cient conditions and to diagnose inflation as a purely inertial problem. Demand 
inflation took its revenge” (262). The necessity of lowering aggregate demand 
growth in order to reduce inflation is sufficiently well documented  that it is 
unlikely  that more knowledgeable  policymakers  would have made the same 
mistake.  Nor  is  Simonsen’s  diagnosis  controversial:  Cardoso  (1988,  288), 
Macedo (1988,296), and Ortiz (1988, 300) all concur with his analysis. 
Russian monetary policy under Viktor Gerashchenko in  1992-93  provides 
another example of a policy failure that appears to have been due to policymak- 
ers’ lack of understanding of existing knowledge about the sources of inflation. 
As many observers have described, Gerashchenko believed that the underlying 
source of Russian inflation in this period was inadequate supply, and that low 
money balances were an important constraint on supply. He therefore believed 
that rapid expansion of the money stock through credits to former state enter- 
prises would reduce inflation (see Sachs 1994, for example). The result was 
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8.2.4  Elected Leaders’ and Voters’ Limited Knowledge 
The final potential source of problems in monetary policy is that, even if the 
individuals who set policy share the best available knowledge about the econ- 
omy, they may answer to individuals who do not. This problem can take two 
general forms. The first is that elected leaders’ understanding of the economy 
may be limited. De Long (chap. 6 in this volume), for example, argues that, 
regardless of whether Federal Reserve officials understood the dangers of ex- 
pansionary policies in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the presidents and their 
political advisers did not. Thus an underlying source of the expansionary poli- 
cies in that period, in his view, was elected leaders’ imperfect understanding 
of the economy. 
A more common example of the potential harms of elected leaders’ imper- 
fect knowledge is the widespread tendency of newly elected leaders from lib- 
eral parties-Carter  and Clinton in the United States in 1977 and 1993, Mitter- 
rand in France in 198  1, and many others-to  pressure monetary policymakers 
to pursue expansionary policies early in their terms. These policies are not 
plausibly explained as resulting from optimizing economic or political calcula- 
tions: more often than not, the resulting inflation requires moves to tighter poli- 
cies later in the leader’s  term, often with highly unfavorable political conse- 
quences. Instead, they appear to result from a desire to improve economic 
conditions (either for political benefit or out of genuine concern for social wel- 
fare), coupled with imperfect knowledge of the long-run consequences of  ex- 
pansionary policy. 
The  macroeconomic policies  of  “populist” Latin American  leaders  de- 
scribed by  Dornbusch and Edwards (1990, 1991) are more extreme instances 
of this type of policy failure. Peru’s economic policies under Alan Garcia from 
1985 to 1990 provide the clearest example. Garcia and his advisers believed 
that inflation resulted from such factors as oligopoly, limited credit availability, 
and exchange rate depreciation. Indeed, they believed that expansion of aggre- 
gate demand, by allowing firms to exploit returns to scale, would reduce infla- 
tion. They therefore pursued policies of rapid monetary and fiscal expansion 
coupled with price controls (Dornbusch and Edwards 1990; Lago 1991). The 
results were disastrous. 
The second, and possibly more important, way  in which monetary poli- 
cymakers may  be  influenced by  incompletely informed individuals is that 
elected leaders must in turn answer to voters, whose understanding is likely to 
be quite limited. There are many different ways  in which voters’ imperfect 
understanding can cause problems in monetary policy. For example, like many 
politicians, voters are likely to understand the short-run benefits of monetary 
expansion, but may fail to realize the long-run inflationary consequences. As a 
result, voters generally favor expansionary policy. Citizens, and the journalists 
from whom they receive most of their information, seem to view reductions in 314  Christina D. Romer and David H. Romer 
interest rates as obviously good and increases in interest rates as typically bad. 
This view leads to pressure on monetary policymakers for e~pansion.~ 
A related example of how imperfect knowledge on the part of voters may 
lead to poor monetary policy is the political business cycle. Since voters do 
not know precisely how the economy operates and have little incentive to find 
out, they may evaluate leaders on the basis of unemployment and inflation at 
the ends of  their terms. This gives leaders an incentive to advocate monetary 
policies that produce recessions early in their terms (and hence lower infla- 
tion), and rapid growth as election day approaches. Nordhaus (1975) shows 
that this effect of  voters’ limited knowledge is indeed present to some extent 
in the United States and other industrial democracies. 
Voters’ imperfect information can also give rise to fiscal pressures on mone- 
tary policy. Persistent budget deficits, coupled with limits on the government’s 
ability to borrow,  are an important source of  high  inflation in  many  less- 
developed countries. One possible explanation of  this reliance on money fi- 
nance is that the public has only a limited understanding of the links between 
deficit spending and inflation. The harms of reduced deficits, such as higher 
taxes,  reduced  government  employment,  and  higher  prices  of  subsidized 
goods, are readily apparent and thus likely to be well understood. But, as Bu- 
chanan and Wagner (1977) argue, the benefit of  reduced deficits-namely, 
lower inflation-is  not as clearly linked to fiscal policy, and thus may be sys- 
tematically underestimated. 
8.3  Possible Institutional Remedies for Policy Failures 
Having described the most important sources of problems in monetary pol- 
icy, we now  turn to the issue of  how to design the institutions of  monetary 
policy to deal with these problems. Our argument proceeds in two steps. In this 
section, we investigate what institutional features can address each problem 
individually. Then, in section 8.4, we discuss the question of what combination 
of institutions would be likely to produce desirable outcomes in the face of all 
of the problems. 
8.3.1  Dynamic Inconsistency 
The most straightforward solution to the problems created by the dynamic 
inconsistency of  low-inflation policy is for policy to be made according to a 
binding rule. Under such a rule, policy cannot depart from what is announced 
ex ante. Thus there is no barrier to following a low-inflation policy. 
3. The fact that limited knowledge on the part of politicians and voters leads to pressure for 
expansion may help explain the widespread acceptance of dynamic inconsistency as the crucial 
problem of monetary policy. Dynamic inconsistency provides an elegant explanation for the ten- 
dency toward overexpansion that we often observe. But it may not in fact be the main source of 
this tendency: the pressure for expansion typically comes from outside the central bank rather 
than from within, and the pressure appears to stem more from limited knowledge of the long-run 
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Arrangements that make it costly but not impossible to deviate from an an- 
nounced policy can also allow policymakers to achieve lower inflation than 
they can under complete discretion. The costs can take the form of monetary 
penalties, loss of prestige, or removal of policymakers from their positions. For 
example, there are generally believed to be costs to governments of  breaking 
agreements to keep their exchange rates fixed. Such agreements can therefore 
help  countries  maintain  low  inflation. Similarly,  directly  penalizing  poli- 
cymakers for pursuing expansionary policies can also counteract the infla- 
tionary bias created by  dynamic inconsistency (Walsh 1995b; Persson and 
Tabellini 1993). 
Empirically, we often observe countries achieving low inflation without any 
of these types of arrangements. And, as Taylor (1983) observes, many govern- 
ments overcome dynamic inconsistency problems in other settings, such as 
patent law and capital taxation, without such measures. In the case of monetary 
policy, there are three leading explanations of these successes. The first is that 
they stem from the delegation of policy to individuals who place more weight 
on achieving low inflation than is warranted by  its effect on social welfare 
(Rogoff 1985). The second is that they arise because policymakers’ horizons 
are longer than a single period. With longer horizons, policymakers have in- 
centives to establish reputations as being anti-inflationary (for example, Barro 
and  Gordon  1983; Backus and  Driffill  1985). The final possibility  is that 
forward-looking expectations are relatively unimportant to the output-inflation 
trade-off. For example, as we describe below, New Zealand took major steps 
in the late 1980s to make credible commitments to reducing inflation. But De- 
belle (1996) finds that these efforts had little impact on the output costs of the 
subsequent disinflation. In the extreme case where there is no forward-looking 
element to the behavior of  inflation, low-inflation policy is not dynamically 
inconsistent, and thus no measures are needed to deal with dynamic inconsis- 
tency. In sum, if dynamic inconsistency is a problem at all, there appear to be 
several ways of overcoming it. 
8.3.2  The Limits of Available Knowledge 
The fact that the best available knowledge about the economy and policy is 
limited clearly cannot be  fully solved. But  there are at  least two ways  of 
allowing improvements in knowledge to be reflected as rapidly as possible in 
policy. The first, which we discuss below, is to put policy under the control of 
individuals with a state-of-the-art understanding of the relevant issues. Such 
experts are likely to incorporate advances in knowledge into monetary poli- 
cymaking faster than less-informed individuals. 
The second way of dealing with limited knowledge is to give policymakers 
the ability to use their state-of-the-art understanding. That is, one important 
way  of dealing with the fact that our knowledge is growing is the opposite of 
the first solution to the dynamic inconsistency problem: policy should be made 
according to discretion. If  the best available evidence at a given time about 316  Christina D. Romer and David H. Romer 
policy is incorporated into a binding rule, the conduct of policy cannot reflect 
improvements in knowledge. If  monetary policymakers had adopted a rule in 
the 1920s, for example, it might have been one of procyclical policy to provide 
an “elastic currency”; in the 1950s or 1960s, it might have been one of rapid 
feedback aimed at stabilization and at maintaining low unemployment; and in 
the  1970s, it might have been one of steady growth of M1 or M2. In light of 
what has been learned since those times, it seems likely that any one of those 
rules would have had large costs. And as we emphasize above, there is little 
reason to believe that we now have a firm understanding of the best policy rule. 
Our imperfect  knowledge  concerns  not just the  specifics  of  how  policy 
should be conducted to achieve a given set of objectives, but also what those 
objectives should be. For example, as described above, there have been major 
advances is recent decades in our understanding of the appropriateness of low 
unemployment as a goal for monetary policy, and there is still great uncertainty 
about such fundamental issues as the optimal rate of inflation and the benefits 
of stabilization. Thus, for discretion to address the problem of limited knowl- 
edge, the discretion must concern both the implementation and the objectives 
of policy. That is, our analysis implies that-in  contrast to the presumption of 
such authors as Fischer (1995)-policymakers  should have not only instru- 
ment independence, but goal independence as well. 
8.3.3  Policymakers’ Limited Knowledge 
The natural solution to the problem that policymakers’ knowledge may not 
be at the frontier of our understanding is to delegate policymaking to experts. 
When knowledge is heterogeneous, policy should be made by well-informed 
individuals with the discretion to use their knowledge. The natural way to do 
this is to delegate control of policy to an independent central bank. 
This argument for central bank independence is very different from the ar- 
gument implied by dynamic inconsistency. In that case, the purpose of central 
bank independence is to delegate policy to individuals who do not share pre- 
vailing views about social welfare. Here, in contrast, the purpose is to delegate 
policy to individuals who are particularly adept at evaluating and maximizing 
social welfare. 
In addition, concern about policymakers’ knowledge and skills provides an 
argument for short terms of office for policymakers and for allowing for their 
reappointment.  Policymakers’  knowledge  and  skills are heterogeneous,  and 
their conduct of policy is likely to reveal considerable information about them 
along these dimensions. If policymakers can be evaluated frequently and dis- 
missed if they are not performing well, then it is possible to take advantage 
of this information. Thus it will be possible to raise policymakers’  average 
skill level. 
8.3.4  Elected Leaders’ and Voters’ Limited Knowledge 
The problems created by the facts that policymakers must answer to elected 
officials, who must in turn answer to the public, may be the hardest to solve. 317  Institutions for Monetary Stability 
Policymakers must ultimately be responsible to the public; if not, there would 
be nothing to prevent them from pursuing objectives completely unrelated to 
social  welfare.  Yet  if  elected  leaders  or voters  have  systematic  misunder- 
standings of policy, it is hard to see how to prevent those misunderstandings 
from being reflected in policy. 
The key to resolving this difficulty is that many important cases of imperfect 
understanding  stem from the  fact  that  the  costs and  benefits  of  restrained 
money growth occur at different horizons. The costs of a recession to achieve 
price stability are immediate, but the benefits of the resulting increased capital 
formation and higher standard of living are spread over the indefinite future. 
The pain of eliminating a money-financed budget deficit through higher taxes, 
lower  government employment,  and higher  prices  of  previously  subsidized 
goods is felt quickly, while again the advantages of greater stability and growth 
accrue only slowly. 
This discrepancy in the timing of the costs and benefits of low money growth 
suggests two institutional features that may help overcome the problems cre- 
ated by elected leaders’ and the public’s limited knowledge. The first is to make 
policymakers’ terms relatively  long. Specifically, their terms should be long 
enough that a substantial fraction of the benefits  of any moves toward  low 
money growth are apparent by the ends of their terms. Consider, for example, 
policymakers faced with high inflation. If their terms are short, they will know 
that, if they embark on a policy of disinflation, the economy will probably be 
suffering through a recession when their terms end. If their terms are long, on 
the other hand, they will know that inflation may be low and unemployment 
normal by the time they are eligible for reappointment. 
The second way  to address these problems  is to create delays in elected 
leaders’ influence over policy. Specifically, if there are long enough lags that 
elected leaders cannot determine the policies that will be undertaken during 
their terms,  they have no incentive to try  to influence policy to exploit the 
public’s misunderstandings. For example, leaders who cannot influence policy 
until  after they are up for reelection have no way  of catering to the public’s 
desire for low interest rates during their terms, or of  pursuing  a traditional 
political-business-cycle policy. 
Long terms of office for policymakers are one way to create delays in elected 
leaders’  control over policy:  if policymakers’  terms are considerably longer 
than elected  leaders’, then policy during a leader’s term will be determined 
mainly by  individuals appointed by his or her predecessors. Even with long 
terms of office, however, an elected leader who can appoint a policymaker has 
an immediate influence over policy. For example, if the term of the head of the 
central bank ends shortly before an election, the elected leader may have an 
incentive to appoint someone who will pursue expansionary policy. 
A more effective way to create delays in elected leaders’ influence over pol- 
icy is therefore through a two-level system where the leaders appoint members 
of  a board of trustees of the central bank, which in turn selects the ultimate 
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cannot appoint a majority of members of the board during his or her term, then 
the elected leader has essentially no ability to bring about expansionary policy 
before he or she is up for reelection. 
The appointment of the presidents of the regional Federal Reserve banks in 
the United States has elements of  this type of two-level system: the appoint- 
ment of  the bank presidents must be approved by  the Board of  Governors, 
whose members are in turn appointed by the president and confirmed by Con- 
gress. Our analysis predicts that policymakers appointed indirectly will favor 
less expansionary policies than ones appointed directly. This prediction is con- 
firmed by the behavior of the bank presidents and governors: the bank presi- 
dents have a systematic tendency to favor less expansionary policies than the 
governors (Belden 1989). 
8.4  Combining the Possible Remedies 
The analysis in the previous section does not provide clear guidance con- 
cerning what set of institutions is likely to produce desirable overall outcomes. 
Several of the institutional features we discuss, such as binding rules and long 
terms of office for policymakers, are helpful with regard to some problems but 
counterproductive with regard to others. This section therefore considers how 
the different features could be combined. 
8.4.1  A Possible Combination 
the problems we have discussed is one with the following key features: 
A possible combination of institutions that could substantially address all of 
an independent central bank with discretion concerning both the ultimate 
goals and the specific operation of policy; 
a two-level structure where policymakers are appointed by a board of trust- 
ees, who are in turn appointed by elected leaders; 
reasonably long terms of office for the trustees and reasonably short terms 
for the policymakers, with the policymakers but not the trustees eligible for 
reappointment; 
provision for the dismissal of policymakers before the ends of their terms by 
supermajority vote of the trustees. 
8.4.2  Benefits 
This package of  institutions has several benefits. Most importantly, these 
institutions have  features that would address the various problems that arise 
from misunderstandings of  the operation of  the economy and the effects of 
policy. By giving policymakers discretion, they allow advances in knowledge 
to be quickly incorporated into the conduct of policy. By delegating policy to 
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ists. By allowing for the reappointment of policymakers, making their terms 
relatively short, and allowing the board of trustees to remove policymakers by 
supermajority vote, they allow the trustees to retain high-skill policymakers 
and dismiss low-skill ones. And, as described in section 8.3, both the two-level 
structure and the relatively long terms of office for the trustees help to over- 
come the problems created by the public’s and elected leaders’ imperfect un- 
der~tanding.~ 
In addition, these institutions allow the dynamic inconsistency problem to 
be overcome either through reputation or through the appointment of conserva- 
tive trustees or policymakers. Specifically, the policymakers have an incentive 
to establish reputations for following low-inflation  policies, and the trustees 
have an incentive to establish reputations for rewarding policymakers who fol- 
low such policies. Alternatively, elected leaders can appoint trustees who at- 
tach unusual importance to keeping inflation low, or the trustees can appoint 
such individuals as policymakers. 
A further advantage of the two-level structure is that it places the choice of 
whether to select conservative individuals as policymakers in the hands of the 
trustees rather than of elected leaders. The optimal degree of conservatism for 
policymakers  depends on such considerations  as the relative importance  of 
keeping inflation low and responding optimally to shocks (Rogoff  1985), the 
costs and benefits of surprise inflation, and the extent to which reputational 
forces overcome the dynamic inconsistency problem. The trustees are likely to 
have much more knowledge about these issues than are elected leaders. 
Finally, the two-level structure provides for the delegation of policy to spe- 
cialists, while keeping ultimate control over monetary policy in the hands of 
elected leaders (and thus of  the public). In the current system in the United 
States, some of the ultimate control over policy is exercised by directors of the 
regional  reserve  banks,  two-thirds  of  whom  are  appointed  by  the  member 
banks in the districts. In addition to introducing the obvious problem of regu- 
lated firms helping to select their regulators, this feature of the current system 
appears antidemocratic; indeed, its constitutionality has been challenged. The 
two-level structure, in contrast, achieves independence and delegation to spe- 
cialists without placing any of the underlying control over policy in the hands 
of anyone other than the public. 
4.  Most of the independence of policy from the public and elected leaders under the two-level 
structure stems from the trustees’ independence from elected leaders, rather from policymakers’ 
independence from the trustees. A  formal analysis of  the optimal way  to create independence 
would show that the optimal structure depends on the relative difficulties of finding individuals 
who are skilled at conducting policy and finding individuals who are skilled at evaluating poli- 
cymakers. If, for example, it is difficult to evaluate policymakers but a good evaluator can confi- 
dently identify a large pool of  skilled policymakers, then the optimal way to create independence 
is to make policymakers highly independent of the trustees and to allow for frequent reevaluation 
of the trustees. Our implicit assumption is that the reverse holds-that  is, that it is easier to identify 
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8.4.3  The Specifics of the Two-Tier System 
The purpose of  the two-level system is to provide policymakers with sub- 
stantial independence from elected leaders while allowing for their relatively 
rapid  removal  if  they  are not  conducting  policy  well.  To  accomplish  these 
goals, it is important that the system be structured so that the trustees do not 
take control of the day-to-day conduct of policy. This can be accomplished by 
limiting the frequency of the board’s meetings and by giving it no powers other 
than the appointment, reappointment, and dismissal of the ultimate policymak- 
ers. For example, the members  of  the ultimate policymaking body could be 
appointed to staggered two-year terms. The board of trustees could then meet 
every six months, with its authority limited to the consideration of  the reap- 
pointment of policymakers, the appointment of new policymakers, and (if need 
be) the early dismissal of policymakers whose terms have not expired. 
Because the trustees’ meetings  would be  infrequent,  serving as a trustee 
would be much less than a full-time job. There is a wide range of  activities 
from which trustees could be drawn. Since the trustees would not determine 
the specifics of policy, there is no reason that the board could not include indi- 
viduals who are involved in financial markets  (as long as the policymaking 
body was not making regulatory decisions concerning their firms). Other types 
of individuals who could naturally serve as trustees include academics, mem- 
bers of  think tanks, former members of the policymaking body, former mem- 
bers of the executive and legislative branches with expertise concerning mone- 
tary  policy,  and  industrial  and  labor  leaders.  As  in  other  arenas,  having 
individuals from a variety  of  backgrounds would be a safeguard against the 
appointment  of  policymakers  with  extreme  or idiosyncratic  views.  Finally, 
since the responsibilities of the ultimate policymakers under this proposal are 
similar to what they  are under conventional  systems of direct appointment, 
moving to a two-level system does not require any major changes in the types 
of individuals appointed as ultimate policymakers. 
The structures of  the Reserve Banks of Australia and New Zealand show 
that having a part-time board of trustees is practicable. Both banks have part- 
time boards of  directors.  In Australia, the board consists of academics  and 
business and labor leaders; in New Zealand, it consists of academics and mem- 
bers of the business, agricultural, and financial communities. Conflicts of inter- 
est are prevented by prohibiting bank employees from serving on the boards, 
and by providing for board members’ recusal or dismissal in the event of other 
conflicts of interest. In New Zealand, as we describe in section 8.5, the board 
plays a role similar to the one we envision for the board of trustees: it helps to 
choose the governor and monitors his or her performance. In Australia, in con- 
trast, the board is technically responsible for all aspects of  monetary policy, 
though in practice it generally defers to the governor. Nonetheless, the arrange- 
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8.4.4  Alternative Structures 
If  a two-level structure for appointing policymakers is infeasible for some 
reason, then there would be large advantages to lengthening policymakers’ 
terms. If policymakers have short terms and are directly appointed by elected 
leaders, there would be substantial risk of inflationary bias arising from dy- 
namic inconsistency, of elected leaders manipulating policy to exploit the pub- 
lic’s misunderstandings, and of shifts to low-inflation policy being aborted be- 
fore their benefits were  apparent. Longer terms would  reduce all of  these 
problems. But having elected leaders directly appoint policymakers to long 
terms would eliminate the possibility of quickly removing policymakers whose 
skills prove to be low. It would also give elected leaders more control over 
policy during their terms, and it would leave the choice of the degree of conser- 
vatism of  policymakers to elected leaders rather than to a board of  trustees. 
For these reasons, a two-level system is likely to produce more desirable out- 
comes than the direct appointment of policymakers to long terms. 
A more fundamental alternative to the two-tier structure is one that makes 
policy follow a binding rule or that specifies the ultimate goals of policy. If 
the only source of problems in policy were dynamic inconsistency, such an 
arrangement might be preferable to the set of  institutions we have been dis- 
cussing. If it is possible to identify the optimal policy rule, for example, then 
committing to that rule is optimal. 
As described above, such a rule is not necessary to overcoming dynamic 
inconsistency: countries often achieve low inflation without any arrangement 
along these lines. Moreover, the set of institutions we discuss allows reputation 
and delegation to overcome dynamic inconsistency. Thus the potential advan- 
tages of binding rules and prespecified goals over the combination of an inde- 
pendent central bank and a two-tier structure are small. 
More importantly, commitment to a binding rule is likely to be less success- 
ful in addressing problems other than dynamic inconsistency. We do not in fact 
know the optimal policy rule. The issue is not just that it is impossible to iden- 
tify every possible type of  shock in advance. The more fundamental problem 
is that, as described above, there is great uncertainty about such basic issues as 
the optimal inflation rate and the relative importance of keeping inflation on 
target versus smoothing fluctuations in output. Thus trying to specify a binding 
rule for policy, or even what policymakers’ ultimate goals should be, may have 
large costs. 
Specifying a rule but allowing it to be changed easily will not solve the 
problems caused by limited knowledge. Since the elected officials responsible 
for setting and modifying such a rule would be likely to have limited expertise 
concerning monetary policy, this system would not allow advances in the best 
available knowledge to be reflected quickly in policymaking, and it could force 
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if  a policy rule can be easily changed, it is of  little value in dealing with the 
dynamic inconsistency problem. Similarly, having a vague goal or rule, such 
as a requirement that monetary policy be conducted so as to promote social 
welfare, would be essentially the same as granting the central bank complete 
goal independence. 
Finally, two features could easily be added to the combination of institutions 
we have been discussing. First, one could penalize policymakers for deviating 
from low-inflation policies, as proposed by  Walsh (1995b) and Persson and 
Tabellini (1993). But, just as determining the optimal degree of conservatism 
for policymakers is difficult, so too is determining the optimal penalty for in- 
flationary policies. The optimal penalty depends on such factors as the impor- 
tance that policymakers attach to their own compensation or prestige relative 
to social welfare, and the extent to which reputation  already overcomes dy- 
namic inconsistency. If  reputational forces and the selection of conservative 
policymakers  would already largely eliminate inflationary bias, then adding 
penalties for inflation could result in inefficiently low inflation. 
Second, Debelle and Fischer  (1994) and others argue for the importance 
of increasing policymakers’ accountability by requiring them, for example, to 
periodically  state the goals of policy, explain how the conduct of policy  is 
designed to achieve those goals, and justify any departures from the previously 
announced path of policy. Again, it would be straightforward to add such re- 
quirements to the combination of  institutions we have been discussing. The 
potential benefits of these requirements appear to be small, however. To the 
extent that they help policymakers build support for their policies,  increase 
their credibility, and reduce uncertainty, then policymakers have an incentive 
to take these steps without a formal requirement. And policymaking is suffi- 
ciently complicated that such a requirement would not be a substantial impedi- 
ment to policymakers who wanted to pursue goals other than maximizing so- 
cial welfare. 
8.5  Recent and Proposed Monetary Reforms 
This section analyzes the most important recent monetary reforms in indus- 
trialized countries in light of the preceding  discussion. We  also analyze the 
proposed design of the European Central Bank. 
8.5.1  Policy Changes 
The most common type of recent monetary reform in industrialized coun- 
tries is a shift to a low-inflation policy within existing institutional arrange- 
ments. Changes to policies that made low inflation or price stability the pri- 
mary  or the sole objective of  policy  were made in New Zealand  in  1984, 
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1993. In every case, the change was followed by a large reduction in inflation, 
and a large rise in ~nemployment.~ 
These policy shifts have two implications for our analysis. First, they provide 
clear evidence of the importance of advances in knowledge for the conduct of 
policy. Since these changes occurred without any changes in institutions, they 
cannot be due to changes in the incentives that policymakers face. Nor, since 
they occurred in so many countries, can they be attributed to such factors as 
random fluctuations in policymakers’ tastes. Rather, the changes appear to be 
due to the growing evidence of the absence of a long-run output-inflation trade- 
off, of  the costs of  moderate inflation, and of  the limitations of  stabilization 
policy. 
Second, these shifts are further evidence that policy can avoid inflationary 
bias without binding rules or legislated goals. In all of  these countries, poli- 
cymakers reduced inflation substantially under existing institutional arrange- 
ments. This again suggests that dynamic inconsistency was not the source of 
these countries’ high inflation rates. And since policymakers would have the 
ability to make low inflation their main objective under the institutional frame- 
work discussed in section 8.4, this suggests that these arrangements would be 
sufficient to avoid excessive inflation.6 
At the same time, our analysis has an important implication for these policy 
reforms. Policy was overly inflationary in these countries for extended periods. 
Given what we now know about the costs of expansionary policies, this partic- 
ular mistake is unlikely to be repeated. And by making low inflation the central 
goal  of  policy, the  reforms  in  these  countries  provide  additional  insurance 
against the reoccurrence of this mistake, and make a specific judgment about 
how much weight policy should put on keeping inflation low. 
But these reforms do not address the underlying problems that led to the 
policy failures: they do nothing to give specialists greater control over policy, 
or to raise those  specialists’ average skill  levels. As a result, although they 
reduce the likelihood of  repetition  of  a particular failure  of  policy, they do 
nothing to reduce the likelihood of other failures. Suppose that evidence ap- 
pears that a major change in policy is warranted-evidence,  for example, that 
there are substantial benefits of moderate deflation, or of trying to aggressively 
stabilize the economy while keeping average inflation low. The recent policy 
reforms do nothing that will cause such evidence to be reflected in the conduct 
5.  Of course, policymakers in almost all countries have put more emphasis on low inflation over 
the past fifteen years. We focus on the clearest shifts in the goals of policy. 
6. One could argue that the fact that these countries have been able to reduce inflation only 
through high unemployment indicates that their policies were not fully credible, and that binding 
low-inflation rules would produce a more favorable unemployment-inflation trade-off. But since 
all of  these shifts in the announced goals of  policy were followed by  large declines in actual 
inflation, the idea that the policies-particularly  the later ones-did  not have substantial credibil- 
ity is implausible. Thus a more reasonable interpretation of  the fact that the disinflations had sub- 
stantial output costs is that inflation has an important inertial component, and thus that any use of 
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of policy any more rapidly than was the evidence about the costs of inflation. 
Indeed, by emphasizing our current beliefs about desirable policy, the reforms 
could slow the response to evidence that changes in policy are warranted. 
8.5.2  Institutional Reforms in New Zealand and France 
The two industrialized countries that have significantly altered their mone- 
tary institutions in recent years are New  Zealand  and France. The Reserve 
Bank Act of  1989 altered New Zealand’s monetary institutions in several ways 
(see Dawe  1990; Lloyd  1992; Fischer 1993; Dowd and Baker 1994; Walsh 
1995a). First, it greatly increased the independence of the Reserve Bank and 
gave it much greater control over monetary policy. Second, it made price stabil- 
ity the sole objective of policy. Third, it provided for periodic Policy Targets 
Agreements between the bank and the government on a definition of  price 
stability and a timetable for achieving it. The governor of  the bank may be 
dismissed if  the goals set out in the agreement are not met, unless the failure 
is due to changes in indirect taxes, terms-of-trade shocks, or a natural disaster. 
Fourth, the act requires the governor to issue a monetary policy statement at 
least every six months that discusses how policy is being conducted and how 
that conduct relates to the Policy Targets Agreement and the goal of price sta- 
bility. Fifth, it clearly delineates the roles of the governor of the Reserve Bank 
and the bank’s board of  directors. The governor is solely responsible for the 
conduct of  policy  and  for  achieving the  objectives in  the  Policy  Targets 
Agreement; the board of directors has only a monitoring role. 
Finally, the act changes the procedures for appointing the governor and the 
directors. The directors are appointed by the minister of  finance to five-year 
terms, and can be reappointed. The governor, in contrast, is chosen by the min- 
ister of finance from a list of  candidates submitted by  the board of  directors. 
Like the directors, he or she has a five-year term and can be reappointed. 
These institutional reforms have much in common with the combination of 
institutions we discuss in section 8.4. Policy is conducted by a highly indepen- 
dent central bank with considerable discretion over the implementation of pol- 
icy. The fact that the government must choose the governor of  the Reserve 
Bank from a list drawn up by  the directors sets up a two-level system. While 
not identical to the arrangement described in the previous section, the New 
Zealand two-tier system does mean that the government has only limited con- 
trol in the short run over who is in charge of policy. Furthermore, it makes it 
possible to have the governor subject to dismissal without compromising the 
independence of the central bank. Because of these features, we would expect 
the reforms to produce desirable policy. 
The one’major  feature of New Zealand’s reforms that differs from the frame- 
work described in section 8.4 is the emphasis on price stability. As suggested 
above, this emphasis appears unnecessary: the institutional framework gives 
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that is the most appropriate goal of policy, and does not have any features that 
would incline him or her not to do so in such situations. Indeed, Dowd and 
Baker (1994) find that the main shifts in monetary policy and expected infla- 
tion in New Zealand came in 1984, with a shift in the conduct of policy under 
the old institutions, rather than in 1989. In addition, as we have emphasized, 
the focus on price stability has a drawback: if evidence appears that this is not 
the best goal of policy, policymakers will be unable to respond rapidly. 
France  overhauled  its  monetary  institutions in  1993 (Banque de France 
1993). As in New Zealand, the changes in France gave the central bank much 
more independence and control over policy, made price stability the central 
goal of policy, and required the bank to make periodic reports on its conduct 
of policy. The reforms gave authority over monetary policy to a monetary pol- 
icy council consisting of a governor, two deputy governors, and six other mem- 
bers. The governor and deputy governors are appointed by the government to 
six-year terms that can only be renewed  once. The other members are ap- 
pointed by the government to nonrenewable nine-year terms. 
The overwhelming advantage of these reforms is that they grant control over 
policy to an independent central bank. This will almost surely produce more 
desirable outcomes than having policy determined by the government. The re- 
forms, however, do little beyond increasing the central bank‘s  independence. 
The emphasis on price stability, as we have argued, is probably unnecessary 
and potentially counterproductive. And the reforms do not have any features 
that allow low-skill policymakers to be dismissed rapidly or that prevent the 
government from appointing individuals who would overstimulate the econ- 
omy prior to elections. In short, the French reforms appear to be driven by a 
single-minded focus on central bank independence and price stability, and not 
by a thorough rethinking of the sources of problems in monetary policy and of 
the measures that would overcome them. 
8.5.3  The European Central Bank 
The proposed European Central Bank  (ECB) provides another important 
example of radical changes in monetary institutions. As agreed to in the 1991 
Maastricht Treaty, the ECB would largely eliminate the monetary policy func- 
tions of the various national central banks. As a result, the institutional features 
of  the ECB are likely to be a crucial determinant of monetary  stability in a 
united Europe.’ 
One important feature of the ECB is that it is highly independent. The six- 
member Executive Board is chosen by “common accord” of the governments 
forming the monetary union, based on the recommendation  of the European 
Council. The members of the board are appointed for nonrenewable eight-year 
7. Kenen (1992), Giovannini (1993), and Thygesen (1993) provide useful descriptions of  the 
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terms, and cannot be dismissed arbitrarily. Monetary policy is decided by the 
Governing Council, which  consists of  the heads of  all the national central 
banks and the members of the Executive Board. To ensure the independence 
of the national central bank governors, all of their terms must be at least five 
years, though they can be renewable. 
The independence of the Governing Council is ensured in other ways. First, 
because the ECB is set up by  treaty, it is inherently very hard to change its 
institutional structure. This is in contrast to the Federal Reserve, whose inde- 
pendence can be changed at any time by  a simple act of  Congress. Second, 
independence is assured by a series of articles that prohibit both the European 
Community and the national governments from trying to influence the Govern- 
ing Council of the ECB, and that impose strict limits on the monetary financing 
of official entities. 
While the independence of  the ECB is clearly consistent with the institu- 
tional arrangement we discuss in section 8.4, its organizational structure differs 
in an important way from that framework. The political appointees to the Gov- 
erning Council make monetary policy directly, rather than merely choosing the 
policymakers. As a consequence, the policymakers must have long, nonrenew- 
able terms to ensure their independence. This has the effect that policymakers 
who prove incompetent cannot be removed and those who prove adept cannot 
be reappointed. 
Another important feature of the ECB is its degree of goal and instrument 
independence. The Statute of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) 
states that the “primary objective” of  the ECB is to maintain price stability. 
Many other goals are also mentioned, such as balanced development, a high 
level of  employment, and social cohesion. However, the statute explicitly states 
that these goals may be considered only if they do not conflict with the goal of 
price stability. 
As discussed above, explicit goals may be problematic because knowledge 
about the desirability of various objectives may improve over time. For this 
reason, the ECB’s explicit goal may be less than ideal. On the other hand, it is 
not clear how binding this stated goal will actually be. The ESCB statute con- 
tains no definition of price stability, no procedures for setting targets or transi- 
tion  plans,  no punishments  for  failure  to  achieve price  stability, and  few 
requirements for explaining undesirable inflation outcomes. As a result, it is 
quite likely that the goal will not be binding. Indeed, Thygesen (1993, 18) 
suggests that many fear that the ECB will be more inflationary than the current 
system, which is dominated by the conservative Bundesbank. Therefore, it is 
possible that the ECB has a nearly ideal level of goal independence. 
The ECB also has essentially complete instrument independence. The Maas- 
tricht Treaty delegates the implementation of monetary policy entirely to the 
Executive Board of the ECB. This institutional feature is consistent with the 
view that it is undesirable to tie the monetary authority to particular targets or 
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8.6  Conclusion 
The central argument of  this paper is that, in designing the institutions of 
monetary policy, it is not enough to consider the incentives that the institutions 
create for fully informed, optimizing individuals. It is also important to con- 
sider the limitations of knowledge. Specifically, it is important to account for 
the facts that knowledge is likely to continue growing, that  policymakers’ 
skills are heterogeneous, and that elected leaders’ and voters’ knowledge is 
likely to be especially limited. 
These considerations suggest that, in order to reduce monetary policy mis- 
takes, the institutions of monetary policy should be designed to give control 
over policy to specialists with discretion about both the ultimate goals of policy 
and the specifics of policy operations. They also suggest that the policy institu- 
tions  should  allow  for  frequent  evaluation of  policymakers’  performance, 
while insulating them from political pressures. One way to do this is to make 
policymakers responsible to a board of trustees, and to give the trustees consid- 
erable independence from elected leaders and the public. 
A natural question is whether limitations in knowledge are important to 
other policy issues. For example, it is widely believed that many countries’ 
budget deficits are excessive. Efforts to explain a tendency toward excessive 
deficits on the basis of strategic considerations with fully informed individuals 
have had only limited success. For example, Persson and Svensson (1989) and 
Tabellini and Alesina (  1990) find that strategic interactions between political 
parties with differing views lead to excessive deficits only when certain parties 
are in power, or only when preferences exhibit features that are not particularly 
natural. Given the limitations of these theories, and given the evidence we have 
presented about the sources of failures in monetary policy, the possibility that 
excessive deficits stem from limited knowledge deserves serious consideration. 
More generally, our analysis suggests that the potential effects of  limited 
knowledge should be an important consideration in the design of  any policy 
institutions. We  leave it to future research to determine what undesirable out- 
comes have arisen from limited knowledge in other policy settings and how 
other policy institutions could be designed to avoid those outcomes. 
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Comment  Benjamin M. Friedman 
One of the more positive  developments in economic thinking within recent 
years has been the renewed realization that institutions matter. Not SO long ago, 
a  seeming preponderance  of  economists  earnestly  maintained  that,  even  if 
some poor benighted economy had oddly neglected to put in place its friction- 
less markets, Walrasian auctioneer, and full set of Arrow-Debreu contingency 
claims, it was nonetheless inappropriate if not outright impolite to take such a 
harmless oversight into account in analyzing that economy’s systematic behdv- 
ior. By contrast, today there is renewed attention to the economic implications 
of  a wide variety of institutional arrangements, including elements of market 
structure, legal and  regulatory  restrictions,  business practice,  and  organiza- 
tional structure at both the business and government levels. Christina Romer 
and David Romer’s paper follows the path established by this newer literature, 
and it is the more valuable for doing so. 
To begin at the beginning, however, the paper’s title is misleading. By calling 
it “Institutions for Monetary Stability,” Romer and Romer clearly seek a reso- 
nance with Milton Friedman’s 1960 classic, A Program for Monetary Stability, 
to which they indeed refer at the very outset. But in Friedman’s case, there was 
a clear reason for identifying “monetary stability” as the objective of the pro- 
gram he was proposing. His main recommendation,  listed  as number one in 
the book’s concluding summary, was that the Federal Reserve System not only 
“produce a 4% per year rate of growth in the total  of  currency held by  the 
public and adjusted deposits in commercial banks” but also “keep the rate of 
growth as steady as it can week by week and month by  month” (100). Now 
there’s monetary stability! By contrast, Romer and Romer explicitly reject a 
money growth rule. Indeed, they argue forcefully against any kind of  policy 
rule at all for the central bank, and even against specifying a particular goal, 
like stable prices, as the central bank’s objective. What does their paper have 
to do with “monetary stability”? 
As I shall indicate in due course, this misplaced appeal to “monetary stabil- 
ity” is more than just a matter of title semantics. But there is other ground to 
cover first. 
Romer and Romer’s proposals for the design of central banking institutions 
revolve around three principles. First, actual policy decisions  should rest in 
the hands of knowledgeable specialists. Second, higher government authorities 
should specify neither the goals that these policymakers are to pursue nor the 
precise methods by which they are to do so. (In other words, the policymakers 
should  enjoy  both  “goal  independence”  and  “instrument  independence.”) 
Third, there should be institutional buffers between central bank policymakers 
and publicly elected government officials. 
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It is easy to quibble around the edges of each of these ideas as Romer and 
Romer actually apply them. For example, there are many distinguished “spe- 
cialists” to  whom  I  would not  entrust monetary  policy-not  because they 
know too little, but because they know so much and because so much of what 
they know is wrong. Similarly, I do not think Romer and Romer make a con- 
vincing case that their specific suggestion for a layer of “trustees” that would 
stand between the politicians and the central bankers would be a substantive 
improvement. The Federal Reserve  System’s current structure,  with  evenly 
staggered fourteen-year terms for seven governors, already embodies the two 
features that Romer and Romer highlight, namely, long terms for policymakers 
and “mechanisms that create delays in elected leaders’ influence over policy.” 
I also suspect that conflicts of interest would be a far greater problem for their 
proposed system’s part-time “trustees” than the cursory attention paid to this 
issue here suggests. But dwelling on these details distracts attention from the 
more important issues raised in the paper. 
The more compelling question to address concerns the economic motivation 
underlying  these  organizational principles  and  others  that  the  recent  bur- 
geoning literature on this subject has put forth. The motivation that this litera- 
ture has emphasized more than any other is the familiar dynamic inconsistency 
argument, and Romer and Romer too cite this idea as one element of their own 
reason for proposing  institutional  change. They sensibly opt to address this 
issue by relying on reputation and delegation, rather than precommitted rules 
of policy behavior, so as to preserve the well-known advantages of discretion 
in circumstances in which knowledge is imperfect and what may appear to be 
true at one time-for  example, that  prices  and  any particular  measure of 
money move closely together-is  often demonstrably false not long thereafter. 
Indeed, their paper nicely articulates just the reasons why many knowledge- 
able people have long favored discretionary policy over fixed rules in the first 
place. (Romer and Romer represent the key issue as the evolution of knowl- 
edge, as if  the underlying  behavior in question remained invariant, while  I 
would prefer to put the problem also in terms of changing behavior; but this 
may well be just a question of  semantics. Either way, I certainly agree on the 
advantages of discretion as opposed to fixed rules of central bank behavior.) 
A particularly welcome aspect of Romer and Romer’s treatment of this issue 
is their recognition that, for purposes of practical policymaking, dynamic con- 
sistency is probably not the major problem that the existing literature makes it 
out to be. Notwithstanding the appeal of  the logical argument at an abstract 
level, there is no persuasive evidence that dynamic inconsistency is in practice 
a major cause of bad central bank policy or poor economic performance in the 
United States or in economies that resemble the U.S. economy. Fifteen years 
ago, when economists first advanced this idea, persistently high rates of infla- 
tion were a major issue in most industrialized countries. The dynamic inconsis- 
tency model, pointing to institutional arrangements that allowed discretionary 
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meaning but nevertheless short-sighted ways, seemed to offer an explanation. 
But during the last fifteen years most industrialized countries have succeeded 
in dramatically reducing their inflation-and,  importantly, in most cases they 
have done so under institutional  arrangements no different from that which 
they had before. 
The one apparently hard fact that the relevant literature has highlighted  in 
the attempt to bolster the case that dynamic inconsistency is actually a serious 
problem is that countries with more-independent central banks have enjoyed 
lower average inflation rates. But as Romer and Romer are careful to note, this 
fact “is  consistent  with” empirical importance of  dynamic inconsistency;  it 
does not show dynamic inconsistency to be empirically important. Further, a 
related proposition  that, if true, would  provide evidence that the correlation 
between  central bank independence and low inflation were indeed a conse- 
quence of dynamic inconsistency fails when tested. In particular, the logic of 
the dynamic inconsistency  argument implies  that more-independent central 
banks  should have greater  “credibility”  and on that account enjoy a smaller 
“sacrifice ratio” whenever they do need to disinflate. As Adam Posen (1995) 
and others have shown, however, the evidence does not support this proposi- 
tion. For example, Posen has shown for a sample including the seventeen prin- 
cipal OECD economies that there is no evidence that the costs of disinflation 
are lower  in  countries with  independent central  banks, even  when  cross- 
country differences in wage contracting behavior are taken into account. 
Although Romer and Romer usefully downplay the importance of dynamic 
inconsistency as a motivation for the changes that they propose, their discus- 
sion of “the widespread tendency of newly elected leaders  from liberal parties 
. . . to pressure monetary policymakers to pursue expansionary policies” (em- 
phasis added) nevertheless perpetuates the kind of half-truths that have some- 
how evolved into stylized facts in this particular literature. The specific refer- 
ence to Democratic  presidents  Carter and Clinton is, of course, correct. But 
why have the authors neglected similar pressure from President Bush, which 
even assumed the high profile of the president’s televised State of the Union 
address? It is true that President Reagan never personally called for more ex- 
pansionary  monetary policy, at least not in public, but forceful public  state- 
ments along such lines were a regular  staple of the  “first” Reagan Treasury 
Department  (that is, when Donald Regan was secretary of the treasury). The 
authors have also apparently forgotten that the U.S. president who provided the 
single more famous example within recent decades of pressuring the Federal 
Reserve to pursue expansionary policies was Richard Nixon. These three presi- 
dents were  Republicans.  Finally,  the  authors’  reference in  this  context  to 
French president Mitterrand (a socialist) is again correct. But why recall Mit- 
terrand’s statements while ignoring last year’s quite public disagreement, along 
just  these  lines,  between  newly  elected President  Chirac  (a Gaullist)  and 
Banque de France governor Trichet? One ultimately suspects that this line of 
research may have a broader agenda than merely analyzing monetary policy in- 
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To return to the paper’s main line of  argument, what are the implications, 
for Romer and Romer’s suggestions for institutional change, of the fact that 
the story of monetary policy during the last decade and a half-in  the United 
States as well as many  other countries-has  been one of such apparent suc- 
cess? Not that Romer and Romer’s suggestions are necessarily bad ideas. Only 
that neither they themselves nor the extensive literature to which they appeal 
has provided much empirical motivation for them. Perhaps discretionary poli- 
cymaking, carried out within the existing institutional framework, already does 
the job pretty well. 
In light of this conclusion, and especially of Romer and Romer’s useful em- 
phasis on the more general benefits of  discretionary policymaking, it is im- 
portant to address explicitly the question, discretion to what end? Perhaps the 
sharpest difference between what Romer and Romer suggest here and the pre- 
vailing consensus view on such matters is their call for “goal independence” 
as well as “instrument independence.” For all the familiar reasons highlighted 
in the voluminous literature of  rules versus discretion, the prevailing consensus 
today largely favors instrument independence over any kind of  dictated rule 
like what Milton Friedman proposed decades ago. (Today even advocates of 
responsive feedback rules, like John Taylor, mostly argue that such relation- 
ships would be useful as presumptive baselines, not as hard rules.) I certainly 
favor discretion in this sense, as apparently do Romer and Romer. By contrast, 
I believe the prevailing consensus does expect the central bank to pursue goals 
established by higher government authority. 
One part of Romer and Romer’s argument for goal independence is parallel 
to the usual argument for instrument independence. Economic circumstances 
change, as does our knowledge of economic behavior and of the consequences 
of central bank actions. Constraining policymakers to pursue a specific set of 
goals-especially  a narrowly specified set of goals-risks  directing the gener- 
als to concentrate on fighting the last war. Although Romer and Romer do not 
explicitly mention this example, a bill currently pending in the U.S. Senate 
under the sponsorship of the chairman of the Joint Economic Committee and 
the cosponsorship of the Senate majority leader (S. 1226) is a good illustration 
of what they have in mind. This bill would establish “long-run price stability” 
as the Federal Reserve’s one basic policy objective. (It would allow policymak- 
ers to take account of the short-run implications of  monetary policy actions for 
employment and output, but only within an overriding requirement of long-run 
price stability; hence any tolerated price increases-associated,  for example, 
with adverse supply shocks-would  presumably have to be offset by absolute 
price declines later on.) Compared to such a narrow alternative, I too would 
favor leaving the goals unspecified. 
After reading their paper, however, I think Romer and Romer favor goal 
independence at least in part for another reason: a discomfort, when it comes 
to matters of  monetary policy, with the political process that constitutes the 
apex of governmental authority in a democracy. As the authors choose to state 
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cymakers may  be influenced  by  incompletely  informed  individuals  is that 
elected leaders must in turn answer to voters, whose understanding is likely to 
be quite limited.” Indeed, “the problems created by the fact that policymakers 
must answer to elected officials, who must in turn answer to the public, may 
be the hardest to solve.” Eureknun! The Romers have discovered democracy. 
This, I believe, is the relevance of their misleading title. By focusing atten- 
tion on the substantively irrelevant but vaguely reassuring concept of “mone- 
tary stability,” Romer and Romer sidestep saying what is the intended purpose 
of their suggestions for changing our central bank institutions. Is it price stabil- 
ity? Or superior economic growth? Or more stable economic growth? Or a 
smoothly functioning financial system? Is it all of these? They do not say. And 
they do not want any governmental authority higher than the central bank to 
say either. 
To  be sure, as the pending Senate bill illustrates, there are sets of central 
banking goal instructions that are probably worse than having none at all. But 
having none at all results in a logical circularity that risks potentially imposing 
just the kind of limitation Romer and Romer seek to avoid: Suppose our central 
bankers are instructed only to use the instruments at their disposal to do as 
much good for the American people as they can, however they conceive it. The 
central bank’s goals are then implicitly defined by  whatever can be achieved 
with the instruments at hand today. So far, so good. But how could anyone, 
under this  arrangement, cogently  evaluate a potential  change in the  central 
bank’s set of instruments? Contemplating the introduction of a new instrument, 
or a change in  the authorized use of an existing one, is possible  only when 
there are agreed objectives that have a status independent of the instruments 
themselves. 
More important, we do live in a democracy and we are fortunate that we do. 
Yes, “elected leaders’ understanding of the economy may be limited.” And yes, 
“elected leaders must in turn answer to voters, whose understanding is likely 
to be quite limited.” For just these reasons, delegating central bank policymak- 
ing to appointed officials and giving those appointees substantial independence 
makes sense, just as it makes sense to place administration of the legal system 
in the hands of a substantially independent judiciary. But conceiving of central 
banking along the lines of a Platonic republic, with knowledgeable  “special- 
ists” as the philosopher-kings,  is not the answer. The central bank’s philoso- 
pher-kings should at least pursue objectives established by the ultimate source 
of their authority. The democratic process, with all its faults, is that source. 
References 
Friedman, Milton. 1960.  A program  for monetary stability. New York: Fordham Univer- 
Posen, Adam. 1995. Central bank independence and disinflationary credibility:  A miss- 
sity Press. 
ing link. Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Report no.  1. May. 